St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 4

Number 3

Article 17

12-1-1972

The Cross Section Principle as a Constitutional Right and the Use
of Voter Registration Lists as an Administrative Technique to
Insure a Defendant Due Process under the Law.
Ellen E. Cook

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ellen E. Cook, The Cross Section Principle as a Constitutional Right and the Use of Voter Registration Lists
as an Administrative Technique to Insure a Defendant Due Process under the Law., 4 ST. MARY'S L.J.
(1972).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol4/iss3/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Cook: The Cross Section Principle as a Constitutional Right and the Use

STATUTORY NOTE
JURIES--THE JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT-THE CROSS SECTION
PRINCIPLE As A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND THE USE OF- VOTER
REGISTRATION LISTS As AN ADMINISTRATIVE TECHNIQUE To INSURE
A DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS UNDER THE LAW. 28 U.S.C. §§ 186169 (1970).
Prior to the passage of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,1
the image of a fair and impartial jury loomed as an elusive spectre
in American justice. In theory, the jury has consistently occupied a
position of substantial importance in the foundation of our legal
system 2 and yet, in practice, the methods for determining its most
equitable composition and for insuring its most effective use have
remained nebulous and ill defined. The purpose of those entrusted
with judicial reform was to dispel that obscurity and to respond with a
concrete comprehensive program for the uniform selection of grand
and petit jurors in federal courts.4 In addition, those charged with
actually writing the Act sought to delineate objective standards for
excluding or excusing prospective jurors5 while preserving for the
districts some degree of flexibility in the final selection process.6 The
Act which became the product of that response declares:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal
128 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the Act or the
Federal Act].
2 See S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967).
A jury chosen from a representative community sample is a fundamental of our
system of justice. Yet, ironically, little attention has been given to the methods of
jury selection actually used in Federal courts. Instead, this Nation has stated and
restated its commitment to the goal of the representative jury without making any
significant effort to insure that this goal is attained.
8 Id. See also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 42 F.R.D. 353, 354-59 (1967).

4 S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967). For judicial interpretation of that purpose, see United States v. Torquato, 308 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1970) provides that:
(b) In making such determination the chief judge of the district court . . . shall
deem any person qualified to serve on grant [sic] and petit juries in the district court
unless he(1) is not a citizen of the United States twenty one years old who has resided for
a period of one year within the judicial district;

(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree
of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form;
(3) is unable to speak the English language;
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory
jury service; or
(5) has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored by pardon or
amnesty.
6 S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 15 (1967).
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courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the
community .... It is further the policy of the United States that
all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for ser7
vice ....
To implement this declaration of policy, the Act requires that each
United States district court devise and place into operation a written
plan subject to the provisions of the legislative draft. s To effectuate
its purpose, however, the Act incorporates two criteria9 procedurally
and philosophically dependent. The first authorizes the use of voter
registration lists or the lists of actual voters as the basic source of juror
names'0 and specifies that the district designate which of the two it
intends to employ." The second prescribes that voter lists need not
perfectly mirror every element in society, 1 2 but that whenever they do
not adequately reflect a cross section of the community, supplementary
sources must be consulted." Although these criteria taken separately
were not unique in orgin or approach, the assimilation of both into
one legislative mandate represented an innovative attempt to define
and delimit the inherently vague description of fair and impartial.
Nevertheless, the draftsmen of the Act were cognizant of an important
"built-in screening element"' 14 in this ostensibly objective criteria-the
elimination of those who are either unqualified to vote or insufficiently
interested in political affairs to do so.1
The critical inquiry at this point questions whether the cross section
principle can be adequately defined to render it appropriate as a philosophical goal, and second, whether voter registration lists can be effectively applied to render them equitable as an administrative technique.
In order to fully evaluate these present issues, it is necessary to review
the past.
The conceptual image of the jury as a body truly representive of
the community was not a novel idea, but one tracing its genetic origin
to the rivalry between the Star Chamber and the grand jury in Tudor
7 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
8 Id. § 1863(a).

S. REP'. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 16 (1967).
10 Id.
11 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) provides in part:
(b) Among other things, such plan shall9

(2) specify whether the names of prospective jurors shall be selected from the
voter registration lists or the lists of actual voters of the political subdivisions
within the district or division.
12S. RaP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9,17 (1967).
18 Id. at 17; 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1970).
14 S. R'
No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 18 (1967).
15 Id. at 18.
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England. 16 However, the birth of the phrase, "cross section of the
community," did not occur in American jurisprudence until some four
17
centuries later.
The concept was first suggested in Smith v. Texas,' a case involving
alleged discrimination against blacks. During the late 1940's, the suggestion was amplified when Mr. Justice Murphy began to explore the
ramifications involved in the application of the cross section principle.1 9
Although unsuccessful at that time,20 his campaign to initiate jury
selection reform has since assumed a dual significance; first, because
he translated the cross section concept into its simplest terms, 21 and
second, because he transferred the emphasis of the court from merely
applying the negative belief that no identifiable group be excluded
from the jury process 22 to imposing an affirmative obligation that
proportional representation be provided on each jury list as a requirement of due process.23 It was not until 1966 that this question was
again raised from its state of constitutional limbo.
In 1966, the Eighty-ninth Congress approved and enacted into law
the heavily debated Civil Rights Bill. 24 Aware of the lack of statutory
guidelines as to an acceptable system of jury selection, 25 and mindful
16 1 W. HOLDsWORTHY, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 339-47 (7th ed. 1956); Note, The
"Blue-Ribbon" Jury, 60 HARv. L. REv. 613 (1947).
17 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220, 66 S. Ct. 984, 985, 90 L. Ed. 1181, 1184
(1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S. Ct. 457, 472, 86 L. Ed. 680, 707
(1942), citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S. Ct. 164, 165, 85 L. Ed. 84, 86 (1940).
18 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S. Ct. 164, 165, 85 L.Ed. 84, 85 (1940). The Court declared:
For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise
qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it
but is at war with our basic concepts of democratic society and a representative
government.
19Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220, 66 S. Ct. 984, 985, 90 L.Ed. 1181, 1184
(1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S. Ct. 457, 471, 86 L. Ed. 680, 707
(1942).
20See also Fay v. New York, 322 U.S. 261, 299, 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1633, 91 L. Ed. 2043, 2066
(1947) (dissenting opinion).
21 [T]here is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group which represents a
cross-section of the community. And a cross-section of the community includes
persons with varying degrees of training and intelligence and with varying economic
and social positions. Under our Constitution, the jury is not to be made the representative of the most intelligent, the most wealthy or the most successful, nor of the
least intelligent, the least wealthy or the least successful. It is a democratic institution, representative of all qualified classes of people.
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299, 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1633, 91 L. Ed. 2043, 2066 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
22 At first, this distinction seems to be purely semantic. However, there is a significant
difference between the two as postulates for a constitutional standard. See, e.g., Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477, 74 S. Ct. 667, 670, 98 L. Ed. 866, 869 (1954). This change in
emphasis was expressed in United States v. Tillman, 272 F. Supp. 908, 910 (N.D. Ga.
1967).
28 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299, 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1633, 91 L. Ed. 2043, 2066 (1947).
Due process requires that a defendant be tried by an impartial tribunal. In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99 L. Ed. 942, 946 (1955).
24 See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1463 (1966).
25 For a complete discussion of the opposing arguments involved in the adoption of the
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of the defects implicit in the districts' exercise of individual authority, 26
the sponsors of Title I of the Bill recommended that random selection
of federal jurors be uniformly enforced and that the much embattled
cross section principle be elevated to the stature of a constitutional
27
right.
Similarly, the use of voter registration lists as a medium to secure
the effective operation of the jury system was incorporated as a basic
feature in the 1966 Bill.28 The decision to employ voter lists was
founded on their already extensive and satisfactory use in many local
districts. 29 Moreover, unlike other systems8" which drew deserving
criticism from both jurists8l and laymen82 alike, the use of voter registration lists had repeatedly withstood the test of judicial review. 83 The
courts qualifiedly approved their use with the label "prima facie legal"
less they become a subterfuge to exclude systematically and intentionally members "of any economic, social, religious, racial, political, or
geographical class." 34 When the final draft of the Jury Selection and
Service Act was completed in 1968, its authors purposefully included
85
the recommendations of Title I as the basis for insuring its success.
The enthusiasm which greeted the adoption of the cross section
principle as a constitutional right and the use of voter registration lists
Civil Rights Bill, see Hart, The Case for Federal Jury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129 (1967);
Ervin, Jury Reform Needs More Thought, 53 A.B.A.J. 132 (1967).
26 Hart, The Case for Federal Jury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129 (1967); Ervin, Jury Reform
Needs More Thought, 53 A.B.A.J. 132 (1967).
27 Hart, The Case for Federal Jury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129 (1967); Ervin, Jury Reform
Needs More Thought, 53 A.B.A.J. 132 (1967).
28 Hart, The Case for Federal Jury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129 (1967); Ervin, Jury Reform
Needs More Thought, 53 A.B.A.J. 132 (1967).
29 Hart, The Case for Federal Jury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129, 131 (1967). Voter registration lists were used in Districts of Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, New Jersey and the Virgin
Islands, the Northern District of Illinois, the Southern Districts of New York, Ohio, and
Texas, the Eastern Districts of Texas and Wisconsin and the Western District of Missouri.
30 The two most widely criticized were the key-man method and the practice of selecting
"blue-ribbon" juries. For a complete discussion, see, e.g., Lindquist, An Analysis of Juror
Selection Procedure in United States District Courts, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 42 (1967).
81 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299, 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1633, 91 L. Ed. 2043, 2066 (1947)
(J. Murphy, joined by J.J. Black, Douglas, Rutledge, dissenting).
Z2 "Denying jury service to any group deprives it of one of the oldest and most precious
privileges and duties of free men. It is not only the excluded group which suffers. Courts
are denied the justice that flows from impartial juries selected from a cross-section of the
community. The people's confidence in justice is eroded." President Lyndon B. Johnson,
Message to Congress, April 23, 1968, the text of which is reprinted in Hearings Before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Miscellaneous Proposals
Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 16, at 1048, 1050 (1966).
83 Kemp v. United States, 415 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1969); Camp v. United States, 413
F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1969); Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S. Ct.
1164, 22 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1969); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 829 (1963).
84 Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 275 F. Supp. 591, 603 (E.D. Va. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1968).
85 Hart, The Case for FederalJury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129, 131 (1967).
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as the most significant improvement in our nation's federal judicial
machinery has, in recent years, substantially declined so that today
their combined application is the subject of mounting concern. 6
One of the three major areas of dissension involves the failure of7
the Act to specify what constitutes a cross section of the community.
Implicitly, the Act supposes that courts will rely on judicial precedent
for an accurate description. However, such reliance reveals a multitude
of interpretations38 ranging from not too literal to something less than
proportional.8 9 Nowhere in the Federal Act and rarely, if ever, in
established case law has a successful attempt been made to address the
issue in positive, direct, understandable language. Moreover, constitutional principles require that a statute which empowers the government with authority to adjudicate a defendant's rights must lay down
reasonably clear standards of decision, 40 and further, that in the absence of such reasonableness and clarity, any attempt to evaluate a
particular act is without merit. 41 Consequently, to determine whether
a defendant's rights have been secured by a jury selected from the popu36 On April 24, 1972, Judge Wyzanski, speaking for the United States District Court in
Massachusetts declared:
A jury selection system which is fundamentally based upon voters' registration lists
in a state in which no one is required to register for voting, and in which it is
obvious to anyone who scans the voters' registration lists that the black, those of
Oriental origin, those with Spanish surnames, women, young persons, and poor and
deprived persons generally tend not to register to vote, in proportions related to their
number in the citizenry, and it is obvious to anyone who scans the lists of jurors
actually serving that affluent and educated citizens are a smaller percentage of the
jurors serving than their percentage in the citizenry, is a jury system which raises
constitutional problems of serious import.
United States v. Burkett, 342 F. Supp. 1264, 1265 (D. Mass. 1972) (emphasis added). See
generally Note, Jury Selection Procedures: A Reform, 6 SUFF. L. REV. 865 (1972); 6 SUFF.
L. REv. 1124 (1972).
87 An answer to "what is a fair cross-section" is dealt with extensively in United States
v. Tillman, 272 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Ga. 1967); See also Note, The Jury: A Reflection
of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HAST. L.J. 1417, 1441 (1969).
8 The requirement that a jury reflect a cross section of the community occurs throughout our jurisprudence and arose under the Supreme Court's supervisory power. Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220, 66 S. Ct. 984, 985, 90 L. Ed. 1181, 1184 (1946);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85, 62 S. Ct. 457, 471, 86 L. Ed. 680, 707 (1942); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S. Ct. 164, 165, 85 L. Ed. 84, 86 (1940); accord, Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1776, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 784 (1968); Labat v.
Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 722-24 (5th Cir. 1966).
89 Perfectly proportioned representation is not required. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
209, 85 S. Ct. 824, 829, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 766 (1965); United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d
385, 389 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950).
40 A central concern of the Supreme Court has been the elucidation of the void-forvagueness doctrine. Many statutes otherwise effective are rendered void because they are
fraught with opportunities for the play of constitutional standards. E.g., Gelling v. Texas,
343 U.S. 960, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1359 (1952); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59
S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681, 71 L.
Ed. 1146 (1927). See generally Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 90 (1960).
41 E.g., Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1359 (1952); Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939); Cline v. Frink Dairy, Co., 274.
U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681, 71 L. Ed. 1146 (1927).
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lation of registered voters becomes an impossible, if not unconstitu42
tional, exercise of power without a reasonable standard for comparison.
The second, and by far the most complicated area of argument,
accepts the proposition that case law offers a sufficiently reasonable
definition of the cross section principle to avoid constitutional vagueness,43 but questions the validity of voter registration lists as a procedural device. Critics of the Federal Act point out that because reliance
on voter registration lists eliminates those who do not vote, 44 there is
discrimination against significant groups in the population, including
those which the courts have heretofore sought to protect. Initially,
challenges to the composition of federal juries compiled from the lists
of actual or registered voters were based on the outright exclusion of
specific racial or economic groups. 45 As a matter of proof, the courts
at all levels of the federal system required that the groups be "cognizable, '

46

that their exclusion be systematic4 7 and willful 48 but that

their absence need not be prejudicial to one of the parties. 49 Where
racial or economic interests were involved, compliance with this tripartite standard was relatively simple. Moreover, when the number of
these challenges began to multiply, the courts disposed of the requirement of intent,5 0 and in the presence of prima facie evidence of discrimination transferred the burden of proving otherwise to the prose42 E.g., Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1359 (1952); Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
U.S. 445, 47 S.Ct. 681, 71 L. Ed. 1146 (1927).
43 E.g., Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1359 (1952); Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681, 71 L. Ed. 1146 (1927).
44 S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 18 (1967).
45 See Lindquist, An Analysis of Juror Selection Procedures in the United States District Courts, 41 TEMP. L. Q. 32 (1967). The author identifies these groups as "overt racial
discrimination, and de facto discrimination vis-a-vis many local socio-economic groups
resulting from selection of 'blue ribbon' juries." See also Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 66 S. Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed. 1181 (1946); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67
S. Ct. 261, 91 L. Ed. 181 (1946); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed.
1074 (1935).
40 For purposes of jury challenges, a group to be "cognizable" must have a definite
composition, must have members who share common attitudes, or ideas or experience,
and must have a community of interest which cannot be adequately protected by the rest
of the populace. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also
Grimes v. United States, 391 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
47 E.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482, 74 S. Ct. 667, 673, 98 L. Ed. 866, 872
(1954); United States v. Dangler, 422 F.2d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 1970); Hansen v. United
States, 393 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833 (1968).
48 E.g., United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 568 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969).
49 E.g., Ware v. United States, 356 F.2d 787, 790 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 919
(1966), quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195, 67 S. Ct. 261, 265, 91 L. Ed.
181, 186 (1946).
50Unlawful exclusion may also be unintentional. E.g., United States v. Bryant, 291
F. Supp. 542, 551 (D. Me. 1968), af'd, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970).
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cution. 51 Where the challenges involved the more subtle forms of

discrimination, however, the courts refused to make these same conces52
sions.
The premise that eligible persons unregistered to vote constitute a
political group in the community was first rejected in Gorin v. United
53
States.
In the first place, the group does not include only the politically
inert. It includes also the politically alert, who may perhaps have
lived for a year or more in the district but not long enough in
their ward to be eligible to vote. In the second place, the group has
no distinct or definable outlines .... 54
Later in United States v. Kroncke,55 another court held that those who
do not register to vote forfeit their right to be selected on either the

grand or petit jury.5 6 The validity of this argument was strengthened
by the provisions of the Federal Act prescribing exclusive reliance on
58
such lists57 so that, at present, this position remains essentially intact.
On the other hand, opposing forces contend that both the GorinKroncke arguments, and the postulates of the Federal Act overlook the

reasons why large segments of the population have disassociated themselves from the political process. 59 Even though many of the discriminatory practices in voting have been eliminated, 0 especially since the
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,61 political apathy6 2 and social
alienation6 3 still account for a substantial portion of those who do not
51 E.g., United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 826 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Tillman, 272 F. Supp. 908, 914 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
52 United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724, 743 (D. Md. 1967); United States v. Duke,
263 F. Supp. 828, 837 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
58 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963).
54 Id. at 644.
55 321 F. Supp. 913 (D. Minn. 1970).
56 Id. at 914.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1970).
58 See United States v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664, 671 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Kelly, 349
F.2d 720, 778 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966); United States v. Anzelmo,
319 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (E.D. La. 1970); United States v. Gargan, 314 F. Supp. 414, 417
(W.D. Wis. 1970); ci. United States v. Camara, 451 F.2d 1122, 1126 (1st Cir. 1971).
69 Projecting from polls, of the 48 million who did not register to vote in 1968, four
million were ineligible because they were aliens or inmates of prisons and mental hospitals; 15 million were registered but were disinterested or did not like the candidates;
10 million could have registered but did not vote; seven million were sick or disabled;
five million were prevented from voting by residency requirements; three million said they
could not leave their jobs; one million failed to obtain absentee ballots. Lindquist, An
Analysis of Juror Selection Procedure in the United States District Courts, 41 TEMP. L.Q.
32, 47 (1967). See also Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community,
20 HAST. L.J. 1417, 1423 (1969).
60 E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 16
L. Ed. 2d 169, 172 (1966); U.S. CoNs'r. amend. XXIV (elimination of poll tax).
,6142 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (1970).
62 See Rosenberg, Some Determinants of Political Apathy, 18 PUB. OPINION Q. 349
(1955).
63 Note, Ghetto Voting and At Large Elections, A Subtle Infringement Upon Minority
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register to vote and who, therefore, are ineligible for jury service. As
one sociologist recently observed,
[T]he primary reason for the difference in registration votes is
that low income people in general, and more specifically, the Negro
population is more apathetic vis-a-vis the political process. It is
a case of having less to gain from the political process ....4
Paradoxically, this inertia and intimidation are encouraged by the
use of voter registration lists as the exclusive source of juror names. Not
surprisingly, however, analyses of jury behavior clearly demonstrate
that those who have never before participated in the political process
have, following the jury experience, become actively absorbed in other
phases of government. 6 By eliminating those prospective jurors who
would profit most from this grass roots involvement, the potential force
of the jury as an instrument of education is destroyed. 6
Additionally, the use of voter registration lists may have a "chilling
effect" on the voting franchise itself.6 7 Some persons do not register to
vote simply because in their counties such lists are used for tax assessment and other nonvoting purposes.0 8 In cases involving wage earners
for whom jury service is particularly onerous, those who would have
exercised their voting privilege have refrained from doing so because
they fear the economic hardship which time spent in the courtroom
would necessarily produce. 9 It is precisely for this reason that the
President's Commission on Registration and Voting recommended that
70
voter registration lists be employed for electoral purposes only.
A final criticism of the Act focuses on its failure to distinguish those
circumstances requiring supplementation of the original source list.
The Act itself theorizes that additional names shall be supplied "where
necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights secured by sections
1861 and 1862 of this title. ' '71 The legislative history of the Act refines
the statement to include only those situations where such lists deviate
Groups, 58 GEo. L.J. 989 (1970); Note, The Congress, The Court and Jury Selection: A
Critique of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 52 VA. L. REv. 1069, 1140
(1966).
64 Record, vol. 1, at 88, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal.,
September 27, 1968) (Assistant Professor Dizard, University of California, Berkeley).
65 See Broeder, University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 751-52 (1959).
0 See Kuhn, Jury Discrimination:The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav. 235, 303-15 (1968).
07 Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act. The text of the Act is set forth in McKusick,
Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, 8 HAgv. J. LEais. 280, 292-309 (1971); see also
Note, Jury Selection Procedure: A Reform, 6 SUFF. L. REv. 865, 884-96 (1972).
68 See also Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav. 235, 303
(1968); Mills, A Statistical Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District
Court, 22 MD. L. REV. 205 (1962).
69 See also Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 303
(1968); Mills, A Statistical Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District
Court, 22 MD. L. R.v. 205 (1962).
70 Note, Jury Selection Procedures:A Reform, 6 SuFF. L. Ray,. 865, 884-96 (1972).
71 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1970).
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substantially from an accurate cross section of the community.7 2 In an
attempt to comply with this provision, 73 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit initiated a circuit-wide program to study the need for
supplementation in its component parts. 74 After a determination that
voter registration lists were preferable to lists of actual voters, the
court concluded that the disparity (less than 10 per cent) was insignificant and that any further evaluation would involve unnecessary expense.7 5 The decision of the court is persuasive, but, because the
experiment was limited to overt racial discrimination, 76 the result is
inconclusive as to those groups not included in the scope of their
research.
Significantly, empirical data7 7 reveal that the apathetic, the undereducated, the apolitical, and the disenfranchised although not individually cognizable are composed primarily of those groups which have "a
basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experience"78 to warrant protection by the courts. The demand for safeguarding the interests of
these groups is heightened by the recent adoption of the six-man jury
in criminal cases,7 9 and the trend toward the six-man panel in some
civil cases as well.8 0 This development, rendered constitutionally permissible when the Supreme Court held "that the twelve man panel is
not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by jury,' "81 deserves special consideration in any argument advocating federal jury selection reform.
To anticipate that an amalgam of several individuals will ever be
entirely free from bias is at best an illusory ideal, but,
[g]iven that all jurors are biased to some degree it seems that the
right to trial by an impartial jury is merely a right to trial by biased
who must be chosen in an unbiased non-discriminatory manjurors
82
ner.

72 S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 17 (1967).
73 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (1970).
74 Gewin, The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968: Implementation in the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 20 MERCER L. REV. 349, 363 (1969).
75 Id. at 379.
76 Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit only considered the variance between
the percentage of nonwhite voters in the community, and the percentage of nonwhite
voters contained in a random drawing of names.
77 See Mills, A Statistical Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District
Court, 22 MD. L. REV. 205 (1962); Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision
Theory to the Jury DiscriminationCases, 80 HARv. L. REv. 338 (1966).
78 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
79 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1898, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446,
452 (1970).
80 Cooley v. Strickland Transp. Co., 459 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1972); Devitt, The Six Man
And Then There Were None:
Jury in the Federal Court, 53 F.R.D. 273 (1971); Zeisel ....
The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. Rav. 710 (1971).
81 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1898, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446, 452 (1970),
overruling Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S. Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061 (1898).
82 1970 Economic Discriminationin Jury Selection, Law and Social Order 474, at 491.
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STATUTORY NOTE

The inadequacies and inequities in present jury selection procedures,
particularly the "de facto" discrimination inherent in the use of voter
registration lists as the sole source of juror names, are emphasized by
placing physical limitations on the number of persons who may be
called upon to try the merits of a given case. Unless selection methods
preclude unnecessary prejudice from the outset, the movement toward
the six-man jury may seriously impair the application of the cross
section principle in the contemporary body politic. Further, it may
jeopardize the traditional hope that in selecting federal jurors, individual biases will somehow cancel each other out and that in securing
the successful operation of this system, the number twelve was sufficiently
large to achieve this balance of interests. Finally, it may increase the
potential power that one man may exercise over other jury members
now that his sphere of influence has been conveniently reduced.
Because any bias, whatever its source and however secured necessarily
affects an outcome which lawyers associate with procedural due process, 8 3 it is imperative that the source list correspond as closely as possible to the society from which it is derived. The rules governing the
federal jury selection system must prohibit the intentional or neglectful
exclusion of any group whose presence is vital to the democratic nature
of the jury system. Moreover, such rules must prevent the purposeful
inclusion of any group whose interests would polarize jury panels simply
because they enjoy a similarity in background and experience. Without
these precautions, the propriety and efficacy of the jury as an impartial
tribunal will be destroyed as well as its ability to administer fairly the
rights of a fellow citizen who must submit himself to its judgment.8 4
Therefore, the "built-in screening element" which the draftsmen of the
Act initially thought to be desirable, may, in the wake of structural
change in the jury system itself, prove to be its fatal flaw.
Ellen E. Cook
83 See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294-96, 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1630-31, 91 L. Ed. 2043, 206364 (1947).
84 United States v. Burkett, 342 F. Supp. 1264, 1265 (D. Mass. 1972). The court stated:
The defendant has a right . . . not to have the pool diminished at the start by the
actions or inactions of public officials, nor by the inertia, indifference, or inconvenience of any substantial group or class who do not choose to vote or to serve on
juries.... In this connection jury duty is an obligation owed to the defendant, not a
privilege which at the juror's pleasure the juror may choose to exercise or forego.
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